




Compliance with EU transfer requirements for personal data in the Microsoft Cloud



Compliance with EU transfer requirements for personal data in the Microsoft Cloud

Contents

<u>Summary</u>	2
<u>Introduction</u>	3
<u>European Data Protection Board recommendations</u>	4
<u>Step 1. Mapping all transfers of Personal Data to third countries</u>	7
<u>Step 2. Verifying the transfer tool</u>	8
<u>Step 3. Assessing the laws or practices of the recipient country</u>	8
<u>Step 4: Identifying supplementary protective measures</u>	10
<u>Contractual measures</u>	10
<u>Technical measures</u>	12
<u>Organizational measures</u>	13
<u>Security roles and responsibilities: subprocessors</u>	13
<u>Step 5. Taking procedural steps needed to adopt the supplementary measures</u>	14
<u>Step 6. Re-evaluating the level of protection for personal data</u>	15
<u>Appendix</u>	16
<u>Annex 1: Microsoft Assessment Regarding the Practical Application of U.S. FISA Section 702, U.S. EO 12333, U.S. EO 14086, and DOJ Regulation 28 CFR 201</u>	16
<u>Appendix A</u>	21
<u>Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services</u>	27

Summary

This paper provides guidance to customers of Microsoft Online Services and Professional Services (as defined in the [Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum](#)) in following the six steps the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) recommends that companies take to ensure adequate protection of personal data leaving the European Union (EU).¹ For each step, the customer will find information about what Microsoft does, including a description of specific supplementary measures, to help support compliance with EDPB recommendations.

¹ For the purposes of this document, the European Union also encompasses the three European Economic Area (EEA) countries that are not members of the EU: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.

This document is a summary and for reference purposes only. The information contained in this document (a) is for your internal reference purposes only and should not be interpreted as a binding offer or commitment; and (b) constitutes Microsoft confidential information and may not be disclosed to any third party. This information is provided as of the date of document publication and may not account for changes after the date of publication. Please visit the Microsoft Trust Center website for the latest information.

This document does not modify or constitute a part of your volume license agreement. Any procurement that may result from this information is subject to negotiation and execution of a definitive agreement between customer and Microsoft or, if applicable, customer's chosen authorized Microsoft reseller incorporating applicable Microsoft commercial terms. Microsoft assumes no liability arising from your use of the information in this document.

Microsoft Makes No Warranties, Express Or Implied, In Or Relating To This Document.

Introduction

On 16 July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a ruling (known as “*Schrems II*”) on transfers of personal data from the EU. The CJEU invalidated the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield but confirmed the continuing validity of the European Commission’s Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) as a legal transfer tool for personal data leaving the EU, provided there are sufficient supplemental safeguards. In response to this ruling, Microsoft stopped relying on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield and continued its use of SCC as the lawful basis for personal data transfers. This enabled customers to continue to use Microsoft Online and Professional Services to move personal data from the EU.

Microsoft had anticipated the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) recommendations with its Defending Your Data initiative, which added a new contractual commitment to challenge all government requests for public sector and enterprise data in cases where there is a lawful basis for doing so. The Defending Your Data commitment also provides for monetary compensation for customers’ users if Microsoft were found to have disclosed data in violation of GDPR transfer requirements.

Microsoft is committed to defending the principle that governments should never place global technology providers in the middle of state-on-state surveillance, and Microsoft does not provide, and has never provided, EU public sector customer data to any government.²

Moreover, Microsoft does not provide, and has never provided, EU enterprise customer data in response to government demands for data,

except to the EU, EU member states, countries with a European Commission data protection adequacy decision, and the United States.

In June 2021, the European Commission issued a set of modernized SCC to help companies lawfully transfer personal data from EU to non-EU countries whose laws and practices have not been deemed adequate as required under EU data protection law. Microsoft reviewed its practices in light of the new SCC, evaluated and adapted its supplementary measures, and on September 15, 2021, released an updated version of the [Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum](#) (DPA) implementing the new SCC.³

² For clarity, under U.S. law, providers can neither confirm nor deny having received any specific legal demands subject to a secrecy obligation. While Microsoft is obligated to comply with these restrictions in U.S. law, we disagree with them and continue to advocate for changes in the law to provide our customers and the public additional, important transparency. Please see our biannual [U.S. National Security Report](#) for the most comprehensive, legally permissible picture we can provide at this point of national security-related requests we receive from the U.S. government.

³ [The newly implemented 2021 SCC](#) are entered into between Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited and Microsoft Corporation under the processor-to-processor module introduced by the European Commission.

European Data Protection Board recommendations

In June 2021, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) published a final version of its recommendations on supplementary measures that companies should implement to ensure adequate protection of personal data leaving the EU. It also confirmed that companies can use the SCC to continue to transfer personal data.⁴ These recommendations advise companies transferring data from the EU to focus on the practical risks of transfers in light of the data access laws and practices of destination countries outside the European Economic Area (EEA) and of adequate jurisdictions outside the EU. The EDPB steps help ensure that data transfer tools do not impinge on the effectiveness of EU safeguards to protect personal data sent outside the EU.

There is an obligation on the data exporter (in Microsoft's case, Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited) and the importer of the data outside the EU (in Microsoft's case, Microsoft Corporation) to make a risk-based assessment. They can do so by taking into account the circumstances of the transfer, including any supplementary measures that could be put in place. The types of supplementary measures (whether contractual, technical, or organizational) when transferring personal data to third countries should be assessed case by case.


⁴ In October 2022, U.S. President Biden signed an Executive Order on Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities (E.O.) directing the steps that the United States will take to implement U.S. commitments under the European Union-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (EU-U.S. DPF) announced by President Biden and European Commission President von der Leyen in March of 2022. The EU-U.S. DPF program must now be recognized as "adequate" by the European Commission, a process which is expected to take until early 2023. Meanwhile, the changes to U.S. law took effect in October 2022, and are referenced in [Annex 1](#). They address the concerns related to U.S. government signals intelligence that the CJEU raised when striking down the prior EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework in 2020.

European Data Protection Board recommendations (cont.)

The EDPB recommends data exporters take the following six steps to assess their data transfers and help them determine if they need to implement supplementary measures.

1. Map all transfers of personal data to third countries and assess whether the data to be transferred is limited only to what is necessary.
2. Verify the transfer tool that will be used, such as the SCC.
3. If relying on an Article 46 GDPR transfer tool, such as the SCC, assess whether it is effective in light of all circumstances of the transfer.
4. Identify and adopt supplementary measures—contractual, technical, and organizational—“that are necessary to bring the level of protection of the data transferred up to the EU standard of essential equivalence.”
5. Take any formal procedural steps that the adoption of the supplementary measures may require.
6. Re-evaluate, when appropriate, the level of protection for personal data transferred to third countries and monitor any developments that may affect the transfers.

Steps 1-6



Step 1.

Mapping all transfers of personal data to third countries

The first step is to understand where all personal data goes so that when it is transferred outside the EU it is processed with a level of data protection that complies with EU law. In addition, data exporters need to assess whether the data to be transferred is limited only to what is necessary.

Microsoft offers customers various tools to specify where the personal data they provide to Microsoft services will be stored. Microsoft may also replicate to other regions for data resiliency. Customers and their users may move, copy, or access their data from any location globally.

Microsoft may transfer personal data out of the EU for processing, depending on the service in question. The Microsoft EU Data Boundary, being implemented between 2022 and 2024 will enable public sector and commercial customers in the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to process and store customer data in the region. Microsoft offers a broad array of services, with data transfer processes and practices specific to each service

Azure Services:

[Data residency in Azure](#)

Dynamics 365 and Power Platform:

[Dynamics 365 and Power Platform availability](#)

Microsoft 365:

[Where your Microsoft 365 customer data is stored](#)

Other Microsoft services:

[Where your data is located](#), (See "Cloud services data residency and transfer policies" under "Stringent security for our data centers.")

More information:

[Data Residency, Data Sovereignty, and Compliance in the Microsoft Cloud](#)

[Microsoft EU Data Boundary Overview](#)

Step 2. Verifying the transfer tool

The second step is to verify the transfer tool. In the case of the Microsoft services addressed in this document, they are the Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) that were adopted by the European Commission in June 2021 and Microsoft implemented them in September 2021. Microsoft implemented the processor-to-processor module (Module 3) of the SCC between Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (as data exporter) and Microsoft Corporation (as data importer). The implementation of the 2021 SCC is reflected in the 15 September 2021 Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum.

More information:

[Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum](#)

[Microsoft 2021 Standard Contractual Clauses](#)

Step 3. Assessing the laws or practices of the recipient country

The EDPB guidelines recommend that, in cases where personal data is transferred outside the EU, organizations consider the “practices in force in the third country” that bear on whether “in practice, the effective protection of the personal data” will be maintained. So, for Step 3, data exporters must assess if there is anything in the law or practice of the recipient country that may impinge on the safeguards of the transfer tools being used. Data exporters must also check for indications of practices in the country that are incompatible with EU law and the requirements of Article 46 of the GDPR regarding the transfer tool.

For this evaluation, Microsoft has assessed the publicly available information related to the laws and practices of destination countries outside the EU, EEA, and countries whose laws and practices are deemed adequate by the European Commission, along with safeguards put in place by Microsoft. Based on this assessment, Microsoft believes these laws and practices do not in practice prevent it from fulfilling its obligations under the SCC in regard to transfers of personal data outside the EU and they are compatible with the requirements of GDPR Article 46.

Continued on next page

Step 3.

Assessing the laws or practices of the recipient country (cont.)

Given the focus of the *Schrems II* judgment, U.S. law is particularly relevant. Microsoft Corporation, the data importer under the SCC, is a U.S. entity with particular expertise and experience with requirements of U.S. law. An analysis of relevant U.S. law issues is attached as Annex 1: Microsoft Assessment Regarding the Practical Application of Section 702 and EO 12333.⁵

Also, before opening (or considering opening) a data center in a new country, Microsoft conducts a rigorous assessment of local laws to validate that data in the country will be hosted in a manner that is consistent with Microsoft obligations to its customers.

Moreover, Microsoft does not provide, and has never provided, EU public sector customer data in response to government⁶ demands for data, except to the EU, EU member states, countries with a European Commission data protection adequacy decision, and the United States.

⁵ Once the European Commission has finalized its “adequacy determination” for the EU-U.S. DPF, self-certification to the DPF will alleviate the need for further examination of U.S. law, beyond “Steps.” The EDPB notes in its 2021 guidance, “If the European Commission has already declared the country, region or sector to which you are transferring the data as adequate, through one of its adequacy decisions under Article 45 GDPR or under the previous Directive 95/46 as long as the decision is still in force, you will not need to take any further steps [beyond step 2, verifying the transfer tool], other than monitoring that the accuracy remains valid.”

⁶ For clarity, under U.S. law, providers can neither confirm nor deny having received any specific legal demands subject to a secrecy obligation. While Microsoft is obligated to comply with these restrictions in U.S. law, we disagree with them and continue to advocate for changes in the law to provide our customers and the public additional, important transparency. Please see our biannual [U.S. National Security Report](#) for the most comprehensive, legally permissible picture we can provide at this point of national security-related requests we receive from the U.S. government.

More information:

[Annex 1: Microsoft Assessment Regarding the Practical Application of Section 702 and EO 12333](#)

[Microsoft Law Enforcement Requests Report](#)

[Microsoft U.S. National Security Orders Report](#)

Step 4.

Identifying supplementary protective measures

In the fourth step, data exporters need to identify supplementary measures that may be required to bring the level of protection of the data transferred up to the EU standard of “essential equivalence.” Entities need to take this step only if their assessment in Step 3 reveals that the laws or practices of the destination country could negatively impact the effectiveness of the transfer tool. These measures fall into three categories: contractual, technical, and organizational.

Contractual measures

In response, Microsoft clarified its already strong protections for personal data of customers with new contractual language. Microsoft calls these protections *Defending Your Data*, and includes them in the Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum (DPA). The DPA includes the following commitments:

- Provides additional language to the DPA for clarity regarding law enforcement access that is comparable to what is included in the SCC; therefore, it does not technically change the commitments Microsoft already makes.
- The new language also highlights Microsoft commitments because we rely on processor-to-processor SCC between Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited as the exporter and Microsoft Corporation as the importer, adding the language to the customer terms highlights that this is a commitment to customers and not simply between the exporter and importer.
- This is in addition to our *Defending Your Data* commitments, which include:
 - Protects customer rights with every government request for public sector or enterprise customer data from any government where there is a lawful basis for doing so.
 - Provides monetary compensation to customers’ users if Microsoft is found to have disclosed their data in response to a government request in violation of the requirements of the transfer tool, the SCC.

Continued on next page

Contractual measures (cont.)

The above commitments are in addition to long-standing Microsoft contractual commitments made in the DPA to public sector and enterprise customers regarding requests for access to data by third parties:

- No government has direct access to customer's data. Microsoft scrutinizes all government demands for legal validity and appropriateness. Microsoft has a proven track record of using the courts to challenge government demands that it believes are inappropriate and that do not adhere to Microsoft commitments.
- Microsoft will not disclose or provide access to a customer's data to law enforcement unless required by law. If a law enforcement agency contacts Microsoft with a demand for a customer's data, Microsoft will attempt to redirect them to request that data directly from the customer. If compelled to disclose or provide access to any customer data to law enforcement, Microsoft will promptly notify the customer and provide a copy of the demand unless legally prohibited from doing so.
- Upon receipt of any other third-party request for a customer's data, Microsoft will promptly notify the customer unless prohibited by law. Microsoft will reject the request unless required by law to comply. If the request is valid, Microsoft will attempt to redirect the third party to request the data directly from the customer.
- Microsoft will not provide any third party: (a) direct, indirect, blanket, or unfettered access to customer data; (b) platform encryption keys used to secure customer's data or the ability to break such encryption; or (c) access to customer's data if Microsoft is aware that the data is to be used for purposes other than those stated in the third party's request.
- Microsoft will only disclose or provide access to any customer's data as required by law provided that the laws and practices respect the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms and do not exceed what is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society and, as applicable, to safeguards one of the objectives listed in Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

More information:

[Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum, "Disclosure of Processed Data"](#)

Technical measures

Microsoft implements and maintains the security measures for the protection of personal data set forth in Section 2 of Annex II of the 2021 Standard Contractual Clauses.

Additionally, Microsoft uses some of the strongest, most secure encryption protocols available as barriers against unauthorized access to enterprise and public sector customer data. Proper key management is also an essential element of encryption best practices, and Microsoft works to ensure that all Microsoft-managed encryption keys are well secured.

- Data encryption key management. Azure Key Vault provides powerful control over the management of data access. Azure Key Vault can be used to securely store and tightly control access to tokens, passwords, certificates, API keys, encryption keys, and other secrets.
- Encryption in transit. Microsoft services use industry-standard secure transport protocols, such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) and Transport Layer Security (TLS), between Microsoft datacenters and between user devices and Microsoft datacenters.

- Encryption at rest. Microsoft best practice including double encryption, service-level encryption, and disk encryption to protect data stored in Microsoft datacenters. This defends against the highly unlikely possibility that someone gains physical access to a data storage device in a secure datacenter.
- Encryption in use. Azure can encrypt customer data for certain Azure services while it is being processed. Azure Confidential Computing enables encryption inside hardware-based enclaves, so data is encrypted while in use. This helps protect customer data from numerous security risks, including unauthorized access.

More information:

[Encryption in the Microsoft cloud](#)

[Azure encryption overview](#)

[Office 365 encryption](#)

[Encryption in Microsoft Dynamics 365](#)

[Power Platform compliance and data privacy](#)

Organizational measures

As the data importer, Microsoft Corporation implements robust organizational measures to protect transferred data, including the organization of information security, asset management, human resources security, physical and environmental security, operations management, access control, security incident management, and business continuity management. These measures are set forth in the Microsoft Security Policy and meet or exceed established industry standards for data security, including requirements in ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002, ISO/IEC 27018, and ISO/IEC 27701.

Security roles and responsibilities: subprocessors

All personnel with access to customer data, personal data, or professional services data are subject to confidentiality obligations.

When Microsoft engages other companies (subprocessors) to perform services in support of Microsoft Online Services and Professional Services, and these parties have access to personal data in the course of providing those services, all subprocessors are obligated by contract to redirect to Microsoft any third-party request for customer data.

Most subprocessors perform labor force augmentation services where the personal data remains only in Microsoft facilities, on Microsoft systems, and subject to Microsoft policies and supervision. The use of subprocessors in this manner does not expose customers to any appreciable incremental risk of government requests for their data, because, between the subprocessors and Microsoft, the data remains continuously in Microsoft possession, custody, and control. There are no hosting locations other than those Microsoft already discloses, and these subprocessors do not have the independent ability to respond to government requests in the unlikely event they were to receive such requests.

Other subprocessors perform discrete functions in which they may process limited data on systems they control. While specifics vary with the particular scenario, technical controls help ensure that data protection consistent with Microsoft obligations to customers remains in place. Microsoft technology (such as Azure Databricks) and delivery partners (like Microsoft support call center service providers) that process personal data on their own systems may be legally compelled to independently disclose data in their possession.

Organizational measures (cont.)

However, these partners are limited in number, are required to maintain technical controls to ensure data protection consistent with Microsoft obligations to its customers and are contractually obligated to provide Microsoft advance notice of any such third-party requests for personal data.

More information:

[Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services](#)

[Microsoft Online Services Subprocessor List](#)

[Microsoft Professional Services Suppliers](#)

Step 5. Taking procedural steps needed to adopt the supplementary measures

The fifth step is to take any formal procedural steps required by the supplementary measures that the exporter has adopted.

Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (as data exporter under the SCC) and Microsoft Corporation (as data importer) have ensured these supplementary measures support and do not contradict the SCC or the protections under the GDPR and are thus effective.

Step 6.

Re-evaluating the level of protection for personal data

The last step is to re-assess, at appropriate intervals, the protection afforded to the personal data the data exporter has transferred to third countries and monitor any developments that have affected past data transfers or may impact transfers in the future.

Microsoft provides regular updates to the Data Protection Addendum and subprocessor lists. It also provides any needed updates to the technical and organizational measures outlined in the SCC. In addition, the Microsoft Security Response Center investigates all reports of security vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft products and services, and keeps customers informed of its efforts in the Security Update Guide.

More information:

[Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum \(DPA\)](#)

[Microsoft Online Services Subprocessor List](#)

[Microsoft Professional Services Suppliers](#)

[Microsoft Security Update Guide](#)

Appendix



Annex 1:

Microsoft Assessment Regarding the Practical Application of U.S. FISA Section 702, U.S. EO 12333, U.S. EO 14086, and DOJ Regulation 28 CFR 201

January 2023

Clause 14(a) of the Standard Contractual Clauses (“SCC”) of June 4, 2021, requires both data exporters and importers to “warrant that they have no reason to believe that the laws and practices in the third country of destination applicable to the processing of the personal data by the data importer, including any requirements to disclose personal data or measures authorizing access by public authorities, prevent the data importer from fulfilling its obligations under these Clauses.” The SCC cl. 14(b) also requires that, in making that assessment, the parties consider “the laws and practices of the third country of destination—including those requiring the disclosure of data to public authorities or authorizing access by such authorities . . .”

In its *Schrems II* decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union concluded that Section 702 of the U.S. FISA Amendments Act (“Section 702”) and U.S. Executive Order (“EO”) 12333 do not provide EU data subjects with rights and remedies “essentially equivalent” to those provided under EU law. Consistent with the obligation under Clause 14 of the SCC, Microsoft has assessed whether it has reason to believe that Section 702, EO 12333, EO 14086, and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Regulation 28 CFR 201 would prevent Microsoft from fulfilling its obligations under the SCC. Having made this assessment, Microsoft has determined that it does not have reason to believe that these U.S. measures would prevent Microsoft from fulfilling its obligations under the SCC in the specific circumstances of the enterprise customer transfers contemplated here. To enable our enterprise customers to make their own assessment, we have set out the factors that underpin our conclusion below.

U.S. FISA Section 702

Microsoft has reviewed relevant and reliable publicly available documents issued by U.S. government authorities involved in or otherwise knowledgeable about the U.S. government's use of Section 702 surveillance authorities. Microsoft has thus fulfilled the SCC requirement that it examine "the application of [Section 702] in practice." SCC cl. 14 n.12. A list of those documents is included as [Appendix A](#) (collectively, the "Record"). Microsoft analyzed the information gleaned from the Record to generate insights into how the U.S. government actually applies Section 702 authorities. Based on this review, Microsoft has drawn the following conclusions about the practical application of Section 702:1

- The Record provides no reason to believe that, in practice, the U.S. government uses Section 702 to target legitimate private enterprises. The vast majority of examples of Section 702's application set out in public sources involves the collection of data relating to the actions of individuals and/or criminal groups (such as, terrorist networks). Although the Record reveals an example of Section 702 being used to collect information relating to an enterprise, this example involved a "front company" that was engaged in illegal weapons acquisition for a Middle East terrorist organization.
- The Record provides no reason to believe that, in practice, the U.S. government targets European Economic Area ("EEA") governments with Section 702 data collection. Although the publicly available sources disclose several examples of Section 702 surveillance that uncovered and thwarted terrorist attacks in Europe, none of these sources reference or even suggest any collection of data from governments located in the EEA.
- In practice, the Record indicates that the U.S. government uses Section 702 primarily to collect information in aid of investigations of terrorism, cybersecurity attacks, and weapons proliferation. Section 702 is not used for industrial espionage or to otherwise further U.S. commercial interests.
- A multi-layer oversight mechanism involves all three branches of the U.S. government, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), Congress, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and independent Inspectors General of relevant national security agencies. This oversight is designed to ensure that Section 702 authorities are applied lawfully and are being operationalized in a manner consistent with U.S. law and policy commitments. For example, this mechanism helps ensure that Section 702 is used only to gather specific categories of foreign intelligence information following clearly delineated targeting, minimization, and querying procedures, all of which must be approved by the FISC. Data may be collected only about individual targets, with targeting decisions reviewed by several agencies, including the National Security Agency, DOJ, and ODNI.

Accordingly, based on its comprehensive assessment of the Record, Microsoft concludes that it has no reason to believe that Section 702 would prevent Microsoft from fulfilling its obligations under the SCC in the specific circumstances of the transfers involved here.

U.S. EO 12333

EO 12333 authorizes elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community to collect foreign intelligence information, and regulates intelligence collection techniques conducted by the U.S. intelligence community. However, unlike Section 702, EO 12333 does not permit the U.S. government to compel private parties to disclose information. Accordingly, the U.S. government's principal means of collection under EO 12333 are (1) voluntary cooperation by private parties, and (2) technical collection when private party assistance is not needed.

Microsoft will not comply with any request issued under EO 12333. Moreover, Microsoft encrypts customer data in transit, to include data transferred between the EEA and the United States, which we believe to be an effective safeguard against data collection under EO 12333 without Microsoft's cooperation.

In light of the above, Microsoft concludes that it has no reason to believe that EO 12333 would prevent Microsoft from fulfilling its obligations under the SCC in the specific circumstances of the transfers involved here.

U.S. EO 14086 and DOJ Regulation 28 CFR201

EO 14086 on Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities of October 7, 2022 and DOJ Regulation 28 CFR 201 effective October 14, 2022, establishing the Data Protection Review Court, were developed specifically to address the CJEU's *Schrems II* perceived shortcomings of U.S. law and government practice related to necessity and proportionality of signals intelligence activities, and a lack of independence and bindingness of the former redress system (i.e., the U.S. State Department ombudsperson) available to individuals located in the EU with complaints about U.S. signals intelligence activities. Both laws therefore focus directly on remedying the CJEU's concerns, by providing new rules and oversight around necessity and proportionality of U.S. signals intelligence activities, and a new court system with meaningfully binding and independent redress for EU individuals on the same topic. These laws are a direct result of two years of consultations between the United States government and the European Commission.

First, EO 14086 requires that all U.S. signals intelligence activities be conducted only after a determination that the activities are *necessary* to advance legitimate objectives outlined in the EO, and not conducted for prohibited purposes, also outlined in the EO. The EO also requires activities to be conducted "only to the extent and in a manner that is *proportionate*" to validate intelligence priorities for which they have been authorized. The EO also outlines new validation safeguards, increased internal oversight (e.g., through inspectors general), increased restrictions on data dissemination and retention, and further requires the U.S. intelligence community agencies to develop new procedures and safeguards reflecting the EO, which will be reviewed by the independent U.S. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board ("PCLOB") for compliance with the EO.

Second, EO 14086 and DOJ 28 CFR 201 offer a new redress system for individuals located in the EU, replacing the U.S. State Department's ombudsperson mechanism which the CJEU in 2020 found to be lacking in both independence and binding authority. These issues are addressed with a novel new multi-layer redress system comprising a first level of review by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) serving as the factfinder, and vested with additional independence and authority to direct remedial actions by the relevant intelligence community agencies. The second level of review will be conducted by a Data Protection Review Court ("DPRC") which will rely on the U.S. Attorney General's authority to make final determinations about U.S. agencies actions, but separated from the Attorney General for independence, in this instance by utilizing the Attorney General's special counsel authority to divest his or her powers to a three-judge panel.

The new law further prohibits the entire U.S. executive branch from interfering with the court. Individual plaintiffs will also be afforded the assistance of a "Special Advocate" to advocate for their interests in front of the court (though not in a full attorney-client relationship given national security issues).

Given the exacting scope of EO 14086 and DOJ Regulation 28 CFR 201, which squarely address the issues outlined by the CJEU in *Schrems II*, the involvement of the European Commission in developing the laws, and the fact that the laws require nothing new of private companies, but do require additional privacy safeguards and independent and binding redress from the U.S. government, Microsoft concludes that it has no reason to believe that EO 14086 and DOJ 28 CFR 201 would prevent Microsoft from fulfilling its obligations under the SCC in the specific circumstances of the transfers involved here.

Appendix A: Record for Section 702 Assessment



Appendix A:

The following publicly available sources were reviewed and analyzed to produce the Section 702 Assessment.

Executive and legislative branches

- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Intelligence Community's Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities: Calendar Year 2020* (Apr. 2021) ([here](#)).
- Cong. Rsch. Serv., *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview* (Apr. 6, 2021) ([here](#)).
- Dept. of Com., Dept. of Just., Off. of Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Information on U.S. Privacy Safeguards Relevant to SCC and Other EU Legal Bases for EU-U.S. Data Transfers After Schrems II, White Paper* (Sept. 2020) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities: Calendar Year 2019* (Apr. 2020) ([here](#)).
- Dept. of Just. & Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Reporting Period: June 1, 2017-Nov. 30, 2017* (Dec. 2019) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities: Calendar Year 2018* (Apr. 2019) ([here](#)).
- Dept. of Just. & Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Reporting Period: Dec. 1, 2016-May 31, 2017* (Oct. 2018) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities: Calendar Year 2017* (Apr. 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *"Section 702" Saves Lives, Protects the Nation and Allies* (Dec. 12, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Guide to Section 702 Value Examples* (Dec. 4, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Protecting U.S. Person Identities in Disseminations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (Nov. 2017) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *An Illustration: Understanding the Impact of Section 702 on the Typical American* (Nov. 17, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Glenn S. Gerstell, General Counsel, Nat'l Sec. Agency, *Speech: Judicial Oversight of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (Sept. 14, 2017) ([here](#)).

Appendix A:

The following publicly available sources were reviewed and analyzed to produce the Section 702 Assessment.

- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *NSA Stops Certain Section 702 "Upstream" Activities* (Apr. 28, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A (Unclassified)* (April 18, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Joint Statement of Bradley Brooker, Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., Stuart J. Evans, Dept. of Just., Grant Mendenhall, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Paul Morris, Nat'l Sec. Agency, & Stephen Vanech, Nat'l Sec. Agency, before the Judiciary Comm., U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearing: "Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act"* (Mar. 1, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., *NCTC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702* (2017) ([here](#)).
- Letter from Robert S. Litt, Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., to Justin S. Antonipillai, Dept. of Comm. & Ted Dean, Int'l Trade Admin. (Feb. 22, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Priv. and C.L. Oversight Bd., *Recommendations Assessment Report* (Feb. 5, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Priv. and C.L. Oversight Bd., *Recommendations Assessment Report* (Jan. 29, 2015) ([here](#)).
- Priv. and C.L. Oversight Bd., *Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (July 2, 2014) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency Dir. Of C.L. and Priv. Off., *NSA's Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702* (Apr. 16, 2014) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (June 8, 2013) ([here](#)).
- Richard A. Clarke et al., *Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies* (Dec. 12, 2013) ([here](#)).
- Letter from Kathleen Turner, Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel. & Ronald Weich, Dept. of Just. to Mike Rogers & C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., U.S. House of Representatives (May 4, 2012) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017: Enhanced Privacy Safeguards for Personal Data Transfers Under Privacy Shield* (undated) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Fact Sheet: Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (undated) ([here](#)).
- Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., *Section 702 Overview* (undated) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *Updated FAA 702 Targeting Review Guidance* (undated) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *FAA 702 Practical Applications* (undated) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *FAA 702 Adjudicator Training* (undated) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, *FAA Adjudication Checklist* (undated) ([here](#)).

Appendix A: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)

FISC 2019 Certification of Section 702 Surveillance Program

- [Redacted] Memorandum Opinion and Order (FISC Dec. 6, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Targeting Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Targeting Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Cent. Intel. Agency, Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Cent. Intel. Agency, Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 17, 2019) ([here](#)).

FISC 2018 Certification of Section 702 Surveillance Program

- [Redacted] Memorandum Opinion and Order (FISC Sept. 4, 2019) ([here](#)).
- In re: DNI/AG Certifications 2018 [Redacted] (FISCR July 12, 2019) ([here](#)).
- [Redacted] Memorandum Opinion and Order (FISC Oct. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- [Redacted] Order (FISC Apr. 5, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Targeting Procedures (filed Mar. 27, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Targeting Procedures (filed Mar. 27, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Cent. Intel. Agency, Minimization Procedures (filed Mar. 27, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Minimization Procedures (filed Mar. 27, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Minimization Procedures (filed Mar. 27, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Minimization Procedures (filed Mar. 27, 2018) ([here](#)).

Appendix A: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)

FISC 2018 Certification of Section 702 Surveillance Program

- Consolidated Querying Procedures (filed March 27, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Cent. Intel. Agency, Amended Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Amended Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Amended Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Amended Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Cent. Intel. Agency, Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Querying Procedures (filed Sept. 18, 2018) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Amended Querying Procedures (filed Aug. 12, 2019) ([here](#)).

FISC 2016 Certification of Section 702 Surveillance Program

- [Redacted] Order (FISC Oct. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- [Redacted] Memorandum Opinion and Order (FISC April 26, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Amended Minimization Procedures (filed Mar. 30, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Sec. Agency, Amended Targeting Procedures (filed Mar. 30, 2017) ([here](#)).
- Cent. Intel. Agency, Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Minimization Procedures (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Targeting Procedures (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Affidavit of James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Affidavit of the Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).
- Affidavit of the Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr. (filed Sept. 26, 2016) ([here](#)).

Appendix A: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)

Other courts

- *Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv.*, 427 F.Supp.3d 582 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2019).
- *United States v. Hasbajrami*, 945 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 2019).
- *Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency*, 335 F. Supp. 3d 772 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2018).
- *Klayman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 39 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2017).
- *Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency*, 857 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2017).
- *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l U.S.A.*, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).

Appendix

Annex 2



Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

The data importer provides the additional safeguards as described in Appendix C – Additional Safeguard Addendum to the DPA for data transferred to it as the data importer.

The data importer will implement and maintain appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect Customer Data, Professional Services Data, and Personal Data against accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed. Those measures shall be set forth in a Microsoft Security Policy. The data importer will make that policy available to Customer, along with other information reasonably requested by the Customer regarding Microsoft security practices and policies.

In addition, those measures shall comply with the requirements set forth in ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002, and ISO/IEC 27018. A description of the security controls for these requirements is available to the Customer.

Domain	Practices
<p>Organization of Information Security</p>	<p>Security Ownership. Data importer has appointed one or more security officers responsible for coordinating and monitoring the security rules and procedures.</p> <p>Security Roles and Responsibilities. Data importer personnel with access to Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data are subject to confidentiality obligations.</p> <p>Risk Management Program.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer performed a risk assessment before processing the Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data or launching the Online Services or Professional Services. • Data importer retains its security documents pursuant to its retention requirements after they are no longer in effect.
<p>Asset Management</p>	<p>Asset Inventory. Data importer maintains an inventory of all media on which Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data is stored. Access to the inventories of such media is restricted to the data importer personnel authorized in writing to have such access.</p>

Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

Domain	Practices
Asset Management (cont.)	<p>Asset Handling.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer classifies Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data to help identify it and to allow for access to it to be appropriately restricted. • Data importer has procedures for disposing of printed materials that contain Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data. • Data importer personnel must obtain data importer's authorization prior to storing Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data on portable devices, remotely accessing such data, or processing such data outside the data importer's facilities.
Human Resources Security	<p>Security Training. Data importer informs its personnel about relevant security procedures and their respective roles. Data importer also informs its personnel of possible consequences of breaching the security rules and procedures.</p>
Physical and Environmental Security	<p>Physical Access to Facilities. Data importer limits access to facilities where information systems that process Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data are located to identified authorized individuals.</p> <p>Physical Access to Components. Data importer maintains records of the incoming and outgoing media containing Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data, including the kind of media, the authorized sender/recipients, date and time, the number of media and the types of such data they contain.</p> <p>Protection from Disruptions. Data importer uses a variety of industry standard systems to protect against loss of data due to a power supply failure or line interference.</p> <p>Component Disposal. Data importer uses industry standard processes to delete Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data when it is no longer needed.</p>

Continued on next page

Annex 2:

Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

Domain	Practices
<p>Communications and Operations Management</p>	<p>Operational Policy. Data importer maintains security documents describing its security measures and the relevant procedures and responsibilities of its personnel who have access to Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data.</p> <p>Data Recovery Procedures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On an ongoing basis, but in no case less frequently than once a week (unless no Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data has been updated during that period), the data importer maintains multiple copies of Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data from which such data can be recovered. • Data importer stores copies of Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data and data recovery procedures in a different place from where the primary computer equipment processing the Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data are located. • Data importer has specific procedures in place governing access to copies of Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data. • Data importer reviews data recovery procedures at least every twelve months. • Data importer logs data restoration efforts, including the person responsible, the description of the restored data, and where applicable, the person responsible and which data (if any) had to be input manually in the data recovery process. <p>Malicious Software. Data importer has anti-malware controls to help avoid malicious software gaining unauthorized access to Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data, including malicious software originating from public networks.</p>

Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

Domain	Practices
Communications and Operations Management (cont.)	<p>Data Beyond Boundaries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Data importer encrypts, or enables Customer to encrypt, Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data that is transmitted over public networks.• Data importer restricts access to Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data in media leaving its facilities. <p>Event Logging. Data importer logs (or enables Customer to log) the access and use of information systems containing Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data by registering the access ID, time, authorization granted or denied, and relevant activity.</p>

Annex 2:

Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

Domain	Practices
Access Control	<p>Access Policy. Data importer maintains a record of security privileges of individuals having access to Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data.</p> <p>Access Authorization.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer maintains and updates a record of personnel authorized to access the data importer’s systems that contain Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data. • Data importer deactivates authentication credentials that have not been used for a period of time not to exceed six months. • Data importer identifies those personnel who may grant, alter, or cancel authorized access to data and resources. • Data importer ensures that where more than one individual has access to systems containing Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data, the individuals have separate identifiers and log-ins. <p>Least Privilege.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical support personnel are permitted to have access to Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data only when needed. • Data importer restricts access to Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data to only those individuals who require such access to perform their job function.

Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

Domain	Practices
Access Control (cont.)	<p>Integrity and Confidentiality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer instructs Microsoft personnel to disable administrative sessions when leaving premises that the data importer controls or when computers are left unattended. • Data importer stores passwords in a way that makes them unintelligible while they are in force.
Authentication	<p>Authentication</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer uses industry standard practices to identify and authenticate users who attempt to access information systems. • Where authentication mechanisms are based on passwords, the data importer requires that the passwords are renewed regularly or uses other Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) methods. • Where authentication mechanisms are based on passwords, the data importer requires the password to be at least eight characters long. • Data importer ensures that deactivated or expired identifiers are not granted to other individuals. • Data importer monitors, or enables Customer to monitor, repeated attempts to gain access to the information system using an invalid password. • Data importer maintains industry standard procedures to deactivate passwords that have been corrupted or inadvertently disclosed. • Data importer uses industry standard password protection practices, including practices designed to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of passwords when they are assigned and distributed, and during storage.

Annex 2: Organizational supplementary protective measures implemented for Microsoft online services

Domain	Practices
Authentication (cont.)	<p>Network Design. Data importer has controls to avoid individuals from assuming access rights that they have not been assigned to gain access to Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data they are not authorized to access.</p>
Information Security Incident Management	<p>Incident Response Process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer maintains a record of security breaches with a description of the breach, the time period, the consequences of the breach, the name of the reporter, to whom the breach was reported, and the procedure for recovering data. • For each security breach that is a Security Incident, notification by the data importer will be made without undue delay and, in any event, within 72 hours. • Data importer tracks, or enables Customer to track, disclosures of Customer Data and Professional Services Data, including what data has been disclosed, to whom, and at what time. <p>Service Monitoring. Data importer security personnel verify logs at least every six months and propose remediation efforts if necessary.</p>
Business Continuity Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data importer maintains emergency and contingency plans for the facilities in which the data importer's information systems that process Customer Data, Personal Data or Professional Services Data are located. • Data importer's redundant storage and its procedures for recovering data are designed to attempt to reconstruct Customer Data, Personal Data, or Professional Services Data in the original or last-replicated state before it was lost or destroyed.

