

Βιβλία εργασίας Azure Active Directory

Daniel Wood

Διαχειριστής προγράμματος

Ασφάλεια ταυτότητας Azure Active Directory

18 Φεβρουαρίου 2021

Η σπουδαιότητα της χρήσης του βιβλίου εργασίας του Azure Active Directory για τον έλεγχο συνηθισμένων μοτίβων επίθεσης

- 01.** Τρόπος πρόσβασης στο βιβλίο εργασίας του Azure Active Directory
- 02.** Μέρος 1: Εφαρμογή, διαπιστευτήρια υπηρεσίας και μέθοδοι ελέγχου ταυτότητας που έχουν τροποποιηθεί
- 03.** Μέρος 2: Τροποποιημένες ρυθμίσεις ομοσπονδίας
- 04.** Μέρος 3: Νέα δικαιώματα που έχουν παραχωρηθεί σε οντότητες υπηρεσίας
- 05.** Μέρος 4: Επισκόπηση των αλλαγών που έγιναν στις συνδρομές οντοτήτων υπηρεσίας

01.

Πραγματοποιήστε
ε είσοδο στην
πύλη **Microsoft
Azure**.

02.

Μεταβείτε στο μενού **Azure
Active Directory** >
Παρακολούθηση > **Βιβλία
εργασίας**

03.

Στην ενότητα "Αντιμετώπιση
προβλημάτων", ανοίξτε την
**Αναφορά ευαίσθητων
λειτουργιών**

01.

Εφαρμογή και διαπιστευτήρια
οντότητας υπηρεσίας/μέθοδοι ελέγχου
ταυτότητας που έχουν τροποποιηθεί

- External Identities
- Roles and administrators
- Administrative units
- Enterprise applications
- Devices
- App registrations
- Identity Governance
- Application proxy
- Licenses
- Azure AD Connect
- Custom domain names
- Mobility (MDM and MAM)
- Password reset
- Company branding
- User settings
- Properties
- Security
- Monitoring**
- Sign-ins
- Audit logs
- Provisioning logs (Preview)
- Logs
- Diagnostic settings
- Workbooks**
- Usage & insights
- Troubleshooting + Support
- Virtual assistant (Preview)
- New support request

Workbooks Edit Refresh Undo Redo

Modified Application and Service Principal Credentials/Authentication Methods

Applications and service principals can have multiple authentication methods that are simultaneously valid. It's important to monitor updates to your service principal authentication methods in case bad actors are adding new rogue credentials to allow themselves to authenticate as that service principal.

TimeRange: Last 60 days Operation name: All Credential: All Actor: All Exclude actor: None

Number of application and service principals updated by authentication method (Last 60 days)




Top actors updating authentication methods (Last 60 days)

Search

Actor	Actor_Type	ServicePrincipalsChanged
Managed Service Identity	App	12
jeffs@woodgrove.ms	User	3
joeyc@woodgrove.ms	User	3
Azure AD Application Proxy	App	2
Domain Controller Services	App	1
Azure ESTS Service	App	1

Updates to service principal authentication methods over time



Recent updates to application/service principal authentication methods

Search

TimeGenerated	OperationName	Actor	Actor_Type	Service_Principal_Name	credential	Service_Principal_ID
1/25/2021, 2:03:34 AM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrovechecklist	Other/not logged	1af2f52c-f74f-4a86-8eec-d
1/25/2021, 2:03:34 AM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrovechecklist	AsymmetricX509Cert	1af2f52c-f74f-4a86-8eec-d
1/25/2021, 2:03:34 AM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrovechecklist	Other/not logged	1af2f52c-f74f-4a86-8eec-d
1/24/2021, 1:03:46 PM	Add service principal credentials	Managed Service Identity	App	woodgrove-app	Other/not logged	dcfce8f2-17b4-4139-8d97-

01.

Εφαρμογή, διαπιστευτήρια υπηρεσίας και μέθοδοι ελέγχου ταυτότητας που έχουν τροποποιηθεί

Όλα τα νέα διαπιστευτήρια που προστίθενται στις εφαρμογές και τις οντότητες υπηρεσίας, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του τύπου διαπιστευτηρίων

Ο κορυφαίοι παράγοντες και ο αριθμός των τροποποιήσεων που έχουν κάνει στα διαπιστευτήρια

Μια λωρίδα χρόνου για όλες τις αλλαγές στα διαπιστευτήρια

02.

Τροποποιημένες ρυθμίσεις ομοσπονδίας

Woodgrove | Workbooks | Sensitive Operations Report

- External Identities
- Roles and administrators
- Administrative units
- Enterprise applications
- Devices
- App registrations
- Identity Governance
- Application proxy
- Licenses
- Azure AD Connect
- Custom domain names
- Mobility (MDM and MAM)
- Password reset
- Company branding
- User settings
- Properties
- Security
- Monitoring**
- Sign-ins
- Audit logs
- Provisioning logs (Preview)
- Logs
- Diagnostic settings
- Workbooks**
- Usage & insights
- Troubleshooting + Support
- Virtual assistant (Preview)
- New support request

Workbooks Edit Refresh Undo Redo Share

- Modified application and service principal credentials/authentication methods
- New permissions granted to service principals
- Directory role and group membership updates to service principals

Modified federation settings

This section monitors when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain. For example, this alert will trigger when a new Active Directory Federated Service (ADFS) TrustedRealm object, such as a signing certificate, is added to the domain. Modification to domain federation settings should be rare. Confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrator behavior.

- To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see: <https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365>.
- For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adsfpp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b.

TimeRange: Last 60 days Operation: All InitiatingUserOrApp: All

TimeGenerated	OperationName	InitiatingUserOrApp	AADOperationType	targetDisplayName	TargetResources	Result	UserAgent
12/18/2020, 8:59:57 PM	Set federation settings on domain	jeffs@woodgrove.ms	Update	woodgrove.net	[{"displayName":"woodgrove.net","administrativeUnits":[]},...	success	
12/7/2020, 3:37:54 PM	Add verified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	Unknown	[{"displayName":"Unknown","administrativeUnits":[],"mod...	failure	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...
12/7/2020, 3:12:05 PM	Add verified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	Unknown	[{"displayName":"Unknown","administrativeUnits":[],"mod...	failure	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...
12/7/2020, 3:11:40 PM	Add unverified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	pre2.woodgrove.ms	[{"displayName":"pre2.woodgrove.ms","administrativeUnits...	success	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...
12/7/2020, 3:10:58 PM	Add verified domain	joeyc@woodgrove.ms	Add	Unknown	[{"displayName":"Unknown","administrativeUnits":[],"mod...	failure	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10...

02.

Τροποποιημένες ρυθμίσεις ομοσπονδίας

Αλλαγές που έχουν εκτελεστεί
σε υπάρχουσες σχέσεις
αξιοπιστίας ομοσπονδίας
τομέων

Προσθήκη νέων τομέων και
σχέσεων αξιοπιστίας

03.

Νέα δικαιώματα που έχουν
παραχωρηθεί σε οντότητες υπηρεσίας

Woodgrove | Workbooks | Sensitive Operations Report ✦

Azure Active Directory

- External Identities
- Roles and administrators
- Administrative units
- Enterprise applications
- Devices
- App registrations
- Identity Governance
- Application proxy
- Licenses
- Azure AD Connect
- Custom domain names
- Mobility (MDM and MAM)
- Password reset
- Company branding
- User settings
- Properties
- Security
- Monitoring**
- Sign-ins
- Audit logs
- Provisioning logs (Preview)
- Logs
- Diagnostic settings
- Workbooks**
- Usage & insights
- Troubleshooting + Support
- Virtual assistant (Preview)
- New support request

Workbooks ✎ Edit 📄 🔄 🔍 😊

New permissions granted to service principals

This section monitors for changes to OAuth 2.0 permissions granted to Service Principals. For example, this alert will trigger when a Service Principal is granted Application (AppOnly) permissions to read mail through the Microsoft Graph API. When this occurs, the Service Principal is added to an App Role with a value of Mail.Read.

An attacker could elevate their privileges by using a compromised account to grant new permissions to a Service Principal they control, or by tricking a user into granting permissions. Investigations should focus on high privilege permissions that either grant access to sensitive data, or represent opportunities for lateral movement by attackers.

The first view in this section focuses specifically on Application permissions, which generally (but not always) represent higher risk. The second view is broader- it includes Delegated (App+User) permissions grants and additional audit events.

TimeRange: Last 60 days ClientApp: All Resource: All

New Application (AppOnly) permissions added to service principals

Resource	ClientApp	Role_Added	Explanation	InitiatingUserOrApp	TimeGenerated
Office 365 Exchange Online (4)					
> "JeffTestCreds2" (4)					
Microsoft Graph (4)					
> "JeffTestCreds2" (3)					
	"JeffTestCreds2"	"Application.Read.All"	"Read all applications"	jeffs@woodgrove.ms	12/20/2020, 1:54:46 PM
	"JeffTestCreds2"	"Mail.Send"	"Send mail as any user"	jeffs@woodgrove.ms	12/22/2020, 11:56:24 AM
	"JeffTestCreds2"	"Mail.ReadWrite"	"Read and write mail in all mailboxes"	jeffs@woodgrove.ms	12/22/2020, 11:56:24 AM
> "Mimorony AuthTS API" (1)					
Office 365 SharePoint Online (1)					
> "JeffTestCreds2" (1)					

TimeRange: Last 48 hours Operation: All InitiatingUserOrApp: All

Recent app permissions activity

TimeGenerated	InitiatingUserOrApp	OperationName	ClientApp	Resource	Result
1/26/2021, 4:25:23 PM	jerryw@woodgrove.ms	Consent to application	CCE Test	Not logged	success

04.

Επισκόπηση των αλλαγών που έγιναν
στις συνδρομές οντοτήτων υπηρεσίας

Woodgrove | Workbooks | Sensitive Operations Report ✦

Azure Active Directory

- External Identities
- Roles and administrators
- Administrative units
- Enterprise applications
- Devices
- App registrations
- Identity Governance
- Application proxy
- Licenses
- Azure AD Connect
- Custom domain names
- Mobility (MDM and MAM)
- Password reset
- Company branding
- User settings
- Properties
- Security
- Monitoring**
- Sign-ins
- Audit logs
- Provisioning logs (Preview)
- Logs
- Diagnostic settings
- Workbooks
- Usage & insights
- Troubleshooting + Support
- Virtual assistant (Preview)
- New support request

Workbooks Edit Save Refresh Share Help

Sensitive Operations Report - Apps, Service Principals and Federation Settings

Workspace: All

This workbook is intended to help identify suspicious application and service principal activity that may indicate compromises in your environment. [Learn more](#) about best practices to protect M365 from attacks.

Modified application and service principal credentials/authentication methods

New permissions granted to service principals

Directory role and group membership updates to service principals

Directory role and group membership updates to service principals

This section monitors for Service Principals being as members of Directory Roles (admin roles) or Groups. For example, this alert will trigger when a Service Principal is added to the Company Administrator or Application Administrator role.

An attacker could elevate their privileges by adding a Service Principal they control to a high privileged role or a group that is used to protect access to sensitive resources. Investigations should focus on administrator rules and Groups that either grant access to sensitive data or represent opportunities for lateral movement by attackers.

TimeRange: Last 60 days Operation: Add member to role InitiatingUserOrApp: All

TimeGenerated	InitiatingUser	Items	ServicePrincipalDisplayName	GroupOrRoleNameAddedTo
12/22/2020, 11:49:13 AM	jeffs@woo	All	JeffTestCreds2	"Application Administrator"
12/22/2020, 11:52:28 AM	jeffs@woo	Add member to role	Risky App	"Global Administrator"
12/20/2020, 7:46:25 PM	jeffs@woo	Add eligible member to role	JeffTestCreds2	"Security Operator"

- Select
- All
- Add member to role
- Add eligible member to role
- Add scoped member to role
- Add member to group

Modified federation settings

Επισκόπηση Solorigate

Επόμενα βήματα

- 01 Παρακολουθήστε τη σειρά βίντεο Solorigate σε αυτήν την τοποθεσία
- 02 Επισκεφθείτε την Ασφάλεια της Microsoft για περισσότερες ενημερώσεις:
www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business
- 03 Διαβάστε τις δημοσιεύσεις ιστολογίου στη διεύθυνση:
www.microsoft.com/security/blog/
<https://aka.ms/solorigate>

