

MesaTEE SGX: Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX

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About me

Security Scientist @Baidu X-Lab

Rust Fans Ph.D on Exploit/Mitigation Works on Rust-SGX projects • <u>https://dingelish.com</u>

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- <u>https://github.com/dingelish</u>
 - https://github.com/baidu/rust-sgx-sdk





Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX

Intel SGX for Privacy-Preserving Computation

- Background of Intel SGX
- Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX

Hybrid Memory Safety

- Rule-of-thumb
- Practice on Intel SGX

Towards a Secure and Trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis framework

- What is trustworthiness?
- Achieving trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis using Intel SGX

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Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX

Cloud Provider

Data Owner

Algorithm Provider (can be data owner)

Don't trust each other

Data leaves its owner but still guaranteed to be under control

Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX

Solution Overview

Use Intel SGX to establish trust and TEE

- Secure and Trusted Authentication/Authorization
- Secure and Trusted Channel
- Secure and Trusted Execution Environment

Build system with hybrid memory safety

Trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis

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Apps not protected from privileged code attacks



... UNTIL a malicious app exploits a flaw to gain full privileges and then tampers with the OS or other apps

Intel® Software Guard Extensions(Intel® SGX) Frank McKeen, Intel Labs, April 15, 2015

Attack surface without/with Intel SGX Enclaves



Intel[®] Software Guard Extensions(Intel[®] SGX) Frank McKeen, Intel Labs, April 15, 2015

Memory access control during address translation



Intel® Software Guard Extensions(Intel® SGX) Frank McKeen, Intel Labs, April 15, 2015

Confidentiality and Integrity guarantees



With its own code and data Provide Confidentiality Provide integrity With controlled entry points Supporting multiple threads With full access to app memory

> Intel[®] Software Guard Extensions(Intel[®] SGX) Frank McKeen, Intel Labs, April 15, 2015

Measurement and Attestation

Verify the measurement/signer

Establish trust by Remote Attestation



Sealing and Attestation in Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX) Rebekah Leslie-Hurd, Intel® Corporation, January 8th, 2016

Remote Attestation



Figure is from "A First Step Towards Leveraging Commodity Trusted Execution Environments for Network Applications", Seongmin Kim et al.

Short Summary of Intel SGX

Provides any application the ability to keep a secret

- Provide capability using new processor instructions
- Application can support multiple enclaves

Provides integrity and confidentiality

• Resists hardware attacks

Prevent software access, including privileged software and SMM

Applications run within OS environment

- Low learning curve for application developers
- Open to all developers

Intel® Software Guard Extensions(Intel® SGX) Frank McKeen, Intel Labs, April 15, 2015

Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX

- Hard Limitations of Intel SGX
- No syscall
- No RDTSC
- No CPUID

ullet

128 Mbytes of EPC memory. Slow page-fault driven memory swapping

• No mprotect

Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX

- Hard Limitations of Intel SGX => Challenges
- No syscall
 - No fs/net/env/proc/thread/...
- No RDTSC
 - No trusted time. How to verify a TLS certificate?
- No CPUID
 - Some crypto libraries needs it for better performance
 - 128 Mbytes of EPC memory. Slow page-fault driven memory swapping
 - AI? Big data analysis?
 - No mprotect: JIT? AOT?

Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX



Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX

- Soft Limitations of Intel SGX
- Suffers from memory bugs

Memory Safety?

- Overflow?
- UAF?
- Data Racing?
- ROP?



Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX

- Soft Limitations of Intel SGX
- Suffers from memory bugs
 - **Memory Safety?**
 - Overflow?
 - UAF?
 - Data Racing?
 - ROP?





Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX

Short Summary

- Challenges
 - Re-implement a software stack in Intel SGX environment on a limited foundation
 - Require memory safety guarantees

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Hybrid Memory Safety Programming Languages Guarantee Memory Safety



Hybrid Memory Safety

The Software Stack

Kernel

Syscall

Libc, system libs

Runtime libs

Applications

Hybrid Memory Safety

The Software Stack

Kernel

Syscall

Libc, system libs

Runtime libs

Applications

Hybrid Memory Safety – Rule-of-thumb

Unsafe components must not taint safe components, especially for public APIs and data structures.

Unsafe components should be as small as possible and decoupled from safe components.

Unsafe components should be explicitly marked during deployment and ready to upgrade.

Hybrid Memory Safety – MesaPy as an Example



Linux	Rust-SGX		
Kernel	N/A		
Syscall	OCALL (statically controlled)		
Libc	Intel – SGX tlibc		
Runtime	Rust-SGX sgx_tstd/		



Enclave Boundary





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What is trustworthiness?

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The term **Trustworthy Computing** (TwC) has been applied to computing systems that are inherently secure, available, and reliable. It is particularly associated with the **Microsoft** initiative of the same name, launched in 2002.

What is trustworthiness?

Trusted computing

The term is taken from the field of trusted systems and has a specialized meaning. With Trusted Computing, the computer will consistently behave in expected ways, and those behaviors will be enforced by computer hardware and software.

Gradient-Boosting decision tree

How to achieve trustworthy?

The running instance started with the static binary I wanted to run

The static binary is generated from the codes I want to use

The code I use implements the algorithm honestly

The compiler is not doing evil

Data transfer is secure

Gradient-Boosting decision tree gbdt-rs ~2000 sloc of Rust – Self explain Well commented/documented 7x faster than XGBoost on 1thread Works seamlessly in SGX Clean and clear software stack!



MesaPy SGX

Ported PyPy with strong bound check

Disabled all syscalls

Customized runtime – limited ocall

Eliminate indeterminism

Formal verification

Replace unsafe libraries with Rust crates





Solutions	Spark	MesaTEE Spark	GraphSC	ObliVM	Homomorphic Encryption
Data Encryption	x	\checkmark	х	х	V
Oblivious	x	\checkmark	V	V	х
Turnaround	1 sec	4-20 sec	2-6 days	>100 days	8

We are working with **Baidu XuperData** for applications

NIN_ImageNet (1000 images)

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Q&A

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